Foreign Relations of the United States × 1969 ×
53. Editorial Note
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jor
Indian Ocean and around the Cape.” National Security Council staff member Helmut Sonnenfeldt felt this reflected the further assessment that “South Africa can be counted on as a reliable partner in the future and the black Africans (except possibly Nigeria) cannot.” The policy pr…
13. Memorandum of Conversation
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa
est Africa could be discussed without going to the Territory. Taswell agreed but reiterated the desire to have the Ambassador go to South West Africa. He said some people term South West Africa a threat to international peace and security; how about Nigeria, where they say 1.7 mi…
244. Memorandum of Conversation
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972
ite House reception but not with himself. The Secretary noted that there was a limit as to what the USG should and could do in this regard. The USG had repeatedly been asked to become involved on different sides of international problems, (e.g., the Nigerian-Biafran issue) and th…
3. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972
72. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security Council Staff ( Haig ) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs ( Kissinger )
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972
ed our playing the game at least to the 25th of October. Obviously the fat is now in the fire and the game has started but our chips are already considerably lower than they might have been.) [Omitted here are points 2 and 3, dealing with Israel and Biafra respectively.] 4. Discu…
7. Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of State
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974
nd should be treated accordingly. d. Eastern Hemisphere oil must be considered relatively insecure. While it is difficult to assess relative degrees of security, we would say that of the major producers, 1) Indonesia and Iran are more secure than 2) Nigeria, the Arab states and P…
8. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974
to deny oil to the West. While there are other potential irritants in government-to-government relations between the US and Iran, the Shah or a successor would probably not let them interfere with continued oil production or with exports to the US . Nigeria 26. Nigeria is likely…
9. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Resources and Food Policy ( Katz ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs ( Trezise )
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974
e only one is non-Arab—Iran. 4. Imports of large amounts of Arab oil could not be entirely replaced from non-Arab sources in the Eastern Hemisphere. In 1975 there will still be only three main non-Arab supplies of oil in the Eastern Hemisphere—Iran, Nigeria, and Indonesia. Based…
12. Memorandum From the Director of the White House Energy Policy Staff ( Freeman ) to the Executive Director of the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control ( Areeda )
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974
meet world market competition. [Footnote in the original.] In any event, some imports from outside the Western Hemisphere are necessary because we would not want to shut off the U.S. market to such friendly oil producing nations as Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria and others now and in t…
14. Draft Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974
U.S. could not count on the availability of oil from the Middle East. Limited or Regional Wars —On oil supply grounds alone, the most damaging limited war case would be a lengthy war in the Middle East. Insurgency (e.g. Vietnam) or civil wars (e.g. Nigeria) are unlikely to give r…
118. Editorial Note
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974
he topics discussed by the two delegations included the Saudi participation negotiations, Iran, prospects for negotiation, information sharing, effects of participation , consumer government defenses, Iraq, Libya, Asian offshore, Venezuela, Algeria, Nigeria, Middle East/Arab-Isra…
142. Editorial Note
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974
onalization was a worst-case scenario as it would “completely undermine the domestic position of the Shah and conservative Arab governments and result in their overthrow. Europe and Japan would become entirely dependent on production from Venezuela, Nigeria and Indonesia. Under t…
128. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972
a broader political framework, both in France and in Europe generally; we cannot discuss them purely in a monetary context. Kissinger noted, and there was agreement, that the paper’s language implying past U.S. political coordination with France on Biafra was exaggerated. He sugg…
133. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 60
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972
y entered a new and more positive phase. The key element of mutual confidence and respect for each other’s point of view has been largely restored. As a result we are consulting frequently and in depth on the crucial issues, notably the Middle East, Nigeria-Biafra and Viet-Nam. W…
80. Statement by the U.S. Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference ( Smith )
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972
t a certain number of on-site inspections are essential for adequate verification. 23. With respect to seismic research designed to improve seismic verification methods, I am gratified by the interest expressed so recently by Ambassador Sule Kolo of Nigeria ENDC /PV.396, p. 7. an…
86. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc National Security Council Steering Committee
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972
s that time has arrived to turn seriously to hammering out an agreement on seabeds as only item on which practical results before 24th UNGA are possible. Soviets have tactical advantage of having tabled draft treaty. In addition to Soviet EE claque, Nigeria, Sweden, Mexico, and E…
130. Telegram 4311 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972
hat serious Brazilian objections will not persist. 4. Most serious difficulty at this point appears to be problem involving “contiguous zone”. This problem was raised at Geneva by Argentines who receive some support there from UAR, Ethiopia, Brazil, Nigeria, and Pakistan. After a…
144. Intelligence Report Prepared by Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972
adagascar Thailand Ethiopia Maldive Islands Tunisia Finland Mexico Turkey *France Monaco Uganda Gambia *Mongolia *Union of South Africa Germany *Netherlands *United Kingdom Ghana Nepal * USSR Greece *New Zealand UAR Holy See Niger Venezuela Hungary *Nigeria Yugoslavia Note: Parag…
38. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs ( Sisco )
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972
g a hearing for the argument, I have—at the risk of being brushed aside by the experts as naive—made myself an advocate for a general policy that would justify country quotas for a few selected friends like Iran, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and possibly Nigeria. 2. The longer range p…
97. Airgram A–34 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972
uncils, e.g. a) GOM supported Jarring Mission and advocated peaceful solution to Arab-Israel confrontation, despite growing pressures from Palestine resistance movement, and b) GOM called for end to arms race with Algeria, and end to civil strife in Nigeria. GOM made progress tow…
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